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Court by the district courts when hearing the habeas corpus application of a person detained under state custody. While this point
was not squarely before the court, it would have been well for it to
take a stand on that issue in view of the recent holding in Stonebreaker v. Smyth, 163 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1947). This court held
that although a denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme
Court is not res judicata upon one subsequently filing for habeas
corpus in the district court, yet it is a matter to be taken into consideration by the district court and in the absence of some unusual
situation is sufficient reason for that court to deny the writ of habeas
corpus. In this case the court in effect gave a denial of certiorari
substantially the same weight as if the case had been heard by the
Supreme Court on its merits. Thus the clear right of the prisoner
to the great writ of freedom was lost and the result of the case
unjustified as the court failed to apply, although it considered, the
settled rule that a denial of certiorari has no legal significance.
1
House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945).
S. F. B.

MINES AND MINERALS-STRIP-MINING

RIGHTS-CoNsTRUCTION

OF

$5,615 the surface of 265 acres of land and
leased to D, owner of an underlying twelve-acre tract of coal, the
strip-mining rights for $3,000. The lease gave D the right "to do
any and all acts which are necessary or convenient for the mining
LEASE.-P purchased for

and removal of all said coal, and by way of enlargement . . . the
further right to mine, remove, and market all of said coal . . . with-

out any liability whatsoever from damages that may arise from the
removal of any or all of said coal, or the surface or subsurface or
other strata overlying the, same, or such additional parts of said
surface as.may be necessary or convenient in connection therewith
.... (Italics supplied.) In a suit by P for an injunction and damages for the conversion of ten truck loads (fifty tons) of soil, stone
and shale which D took from the premises to construct a roadway or
ramp to his tipple which was located off the leased premises, the
lower court rejected D's contention that the taking was authorized
by the contract. Held, that the money payment evidences consideration for very broad mining rights. Thus the materials removed
from the premises for the purpose of constructing a road or ramp
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were necessary and convenient to D's strip-mining operations within
the terms of the agreement. Reversed. Stone v. Gilbert, 56 S.E.2d
201 (W. Va. 1949)
The right of the operator, under the terms of the lease, to remove the soil from the leased premises to another tract not covered
by the lease, was considered by the court in the instant case to be
the "single basic question" before it, although it recognized that
another ground for reversal was present. The case presents a
problem of construction as to the use of surface materials under a
clause in a strip-mining lease allowing the operator to do all acts
necessary or convenient in the mining and removal of coal.
A fundamental rule of construction applicable to contracts is
that where the terms of a written instrument are clear and unambiguous full force and effect should be given to the language
used. Strotherv. National Bank, 113 W. Va. 75, 166 S.E. 818 (1932);
Bruen v. Thaxton, 126 W. Va. 330, 28 S.E.2d 59 (1943) (as applied
to a deed); Griffin v. Coal Co., 59 W. Va. 480, 53 S.E. 24 (1905)
(deed to coal together with mining rights). Where strip mining is
involved, a rule not present in the above cases must be considered.
"But certainly enactments with the plain purpose of rigidly controlling strip mining demand of the Court a strict construction of
instruments upon which that practice is based. A liberal construction would be plainly contrary to the declared public policy. .. ."
West Virginia-PittsburghCoal Co. v. Strong, 129 W. Va. 832, 844,
42 S.E.2d 46, 53 (1947) (italics supplied). See also Tokas v. Arnold
Co., 122 W. Va. 613, 11 S.E.2d 723 (1940), and W. VA. CODE c. 22,
art. 23, § 1, and c. 19, art. 21a (Michie, 1949) (relating to strip
mining and soil conservation).
While the facts may vary from those in the principal case the
result reached in cases construing the rights of a mining lessee as to
the use of surface materials generally require that materials be used
on the leased premises, in the absence of express terms to the contrary. Thus, where a lease gave the lessee the right to use the timber on the land, the West Virginia court held it must be construed
as intending only such use as may be necessary to effectuate the purpose of the demise and could not be sold. Paxton Lumber Co. v.
Panther Coal Co., 83 W. Va. 341, 98 S.E. 563 (1919). Nor can the
timber be used on adjacent property operated by the lessee for the
mining of coal. Carmichael v. Old Straight Creek Coal Corp., 232
Ky. 133, 225 S.W.2d 572 (1929). By-products resulting from the
mining process have been held to be a part of the corpus of the
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estate, and cannot be removed by the lessee. Doster v. Friedensville
Zinc Co., 140 Pa. 147, 21 At. 251 (1891). Also, it has been held
that the lessee of a sand and gravel pit cannot remove the top soil
from the premises. Wolfe v. Licking Gravel Co., 71 Ohio App. 172,
48 N.E.2d 254 (1943). Perhaps, the courts in ,limiting the mining
lessee's use of surface materials to the leased premises, unless a contrary right is expressly granted, are carrying over the rule of landlord-tenant that a tenant for years has, in the absence of a stipulation or license allowing him to do so, no right to take clay, gravel,
soil, and the like, unless such material was one of the recognized
profits of the land before the commencement of his tenancy. 1
TIFFANY, LANDLORD &: TENANT § 109 (4) (1912).
The point of difference between the above cases and the principal case is that in the instant case the use off the premises was
viewed by the West Virginia court as necessary and convenient to
the operations on the premises while in the above cases the contemplated use off the premises bore no relation to the operations on the
premises. The case of Sun Lumber Co. v. Nelson Fuel Co., 88 W. Va.
61, 106 S.E. 41 (1921), sheds some light on what the West Virginia
court considers a use of surface materials necessary to the mining
operations on the premises. There the lease gave the lessee the right
to use so much timber as was required to mine and remove the
minerals from the land. In holding that this lease did not confer
the right to use said timber to build miners' houses on the premises,
the court indicated that to be "reasonably necessary" the use of the
substance of the inheritance must be directly connected with the
mining and removing of the coal, not just the lessee's business as a
coal operator, and further, that the use of materials be within the
contemplation of the parties. At 71, 106 S.E. at 45.
In light of the points raised above, it is arguable that a contrary
result should have been reached on this phase of the principal case.
Viewing the following points in the light of our legislative policy
to construe strictly instruments upon which strip-mining rights are
based, it could be argued first that more than general terms are
necessary to give the lessee the right to remove surface materials
from the premises and deposit them elsewhere. Second, within the
view of Sun Lumber Co. v. Nelson Fuel Co., supra, such use off the
premises in the instant case was not within the contemplation of
both parties. "However general the terms may be in which an
instrument is conceived it only comprehends those things in respect
to which it appears that the contracting parties proposed to con-
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tract and not others they never thought of." Doster v. Friedensville
Zinc Co., supra. Third, by allowing the lessee to use surface
materials to build a roadway or ramp to a tipple located off the
leased premises, on the ground that it is necessary to the mining
operations within the terms of the lease, the court in no way limits
the use of the tipple to the operation on the leased premises, thereby
allowing the lessee to do indirectly what he could not do directly.
In the absence of an express agreement a coal lessee cannot use the
surface owned by his grantor or lessor in producing, cleaning, marketing, or in any way handling coal produced on the lands of
another. Mining privileges and rights contained in a lease or deed
relate to coal to be produced from the land covered by the instrument and none other. Marlowe v. Marcum, 294 Ky. 405, 171 S.W.2d
997 (1943); Schmidt v. Schmidt, 284 Ill. App. 628, 1 N.E.2d 419
(1936); Moore v. Lackey Mining Co., 215 Ky. 71, 284 S.W. 415
(1926). For a discussion of West Virginia cases see Donley, Coal
Mining Rights and Privileges in West Virginia, 52 W. VA. L. Rv.
32, 47 (1949).
In failing to restrict the lessee's use of surface materials to use
on the leased premises under a clause permitting the lessee to do
all that is necessary or convenient in the mining and removal of
coal thereunder, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has,
in effect, said the exercise of this right cannot be limited to the
narrow confines of the leasehold premises, but leaves undefined
the extent to which the lessee may go, short of wilful and unnecessary waste. It does not limit the amount of surface materials that
can be taken, nor the distance they may be hauled, nor the tipple's
use to the processing of coal produced from under the leased
premises only, but merely that the tipple be used for the purpose
for which the premises were leased. In a concurring opinion based
upon other grounds Judge Fox said of the point under discussion:
"In my opinion, the mining rights granted were intended to be
exercised only on the leased premises .... on the principle herein
announced, I do not see how a line can be drawn between fifty
tons removed for a short distance only, and five hundred tons
removed for five miles or more, provided the removal is necessary
to effect the paramount purpose for which the lease was executed."
At 206.
However, the question is really one of degree, to be decided
upon the facts of each case; and the court will probably not tolerate
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unreasonable removal of the surface even under the terms of a
grant as broad as the one interpreted in the instant case.
T. N. C.

MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS-LIABILITY

FOR

MAINTENANCE

OF

STREETS AND SIDEWALKS-MEANING OF STATUTE A JURY QUESTION.-

Action against defendant city to recover damages for personal
injuries alleged to have been sustained by reason of a defect in a
sidewalk which made the sidewalk "out of repair" within the
meaning of W. VA. CODE C. 17, art. 10, §17 (Michie, 1949), which
gives a right of action to "any person who sustains an injury to his
person or property by reason of ... any street or sidewalk or alley
of any incorporated city, town or village, being out of repair."
Defendant contends that the defect described, a difference in elevation between two concrete sidewalk sections of one and a quarter
inches, did not render the sidewalk out of repair within the meaning of the statute, as a matter of law. Held, that whether the
defect rendered the sidewalk out of repair in the sense of the
statute was a question for the jury, since it is such that a jury may
reasonably infer that it was not safe for travel with ordinary care,
in the ordinary modes, by day or by night. Smith v. Bluefield, 55
S.E.2d 392 (W. Va. 1949). Affirmed. (3-2 decision).
Liability under the statute does not depend on negligence
of the city in keeping the sidewalk in repair, but is absolute.
Chapman v. Milton, 31 W. Va. 384, 7 S.E. 22 (1888). But the
absoluteness referred to is not insurance liability for any slight
defects. The street or sidewalk must first be found to be out of
repair within the meaning of the statute. Yeager v. Bluefield, 40
W. Va. 484, 21 S.E. 752 (1895). The rule formerly was that where
there is no conflict in the evidence as to the existence and extent
of the obstruction, it is a question of law as to whether the obstruction was such as to render the street not in a reasonably safe
condition within the meaning of the statute. Taylor v. Huntington, 126 W. Va. 732, 30 S.E.2d 14 (1944).
A raised place in a sidewalk one and a half inches high in the
center was held not sufficient to render a city liable for injuries
received by a pedestrian who fell thereon when the place was
rendered slippery by snow and ice and children coasting thereon.
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